Observe
Accept bounded certificate, TLS or catalogue evidence from an identified source.
Work in progress · Reference implementation
Cryptographic discovery · PQC migration governance
Cryptographic Control Plane
A practical exploration of how organisations can discover cryptographic dependencies, preserve the quality of their evidence and govern post-quantum migration without turning uncertainty into an unsupported claim.
v0.9.1Current reference release
Milestones 1–6Implemented locally
Milestones 7–9Safe reference foundations
Production gatesNot passed
How the model fits together
From observation to governed migration
The project treats certificate monitoring as one sensor in a wider control plane. Each stage keeps the evidence that supports it, the assumptions that limit it and the human ownership needed for the next decision.
Validate
Check schemas, provenance, evidence maturity and domain-specific constraints.
Assess
Classify cryptographic exposure while preserving unknown and missing context.
Plan
Use owners, dependencies and target compatibility to propose migration work.
Verify
Require independent pre-change and post-change evidence before closure.
What the reference implementation demonstrates
Controls built around evidence
The codebase is designed for inspection and repeatable local testing. It demonstrates control semantics; it does not demonstrate production coverage, operational resilience or a completed enterprise migration.
Inventory without false certainty
Certificate, TLS and catalogue observations retain source, maturity and coverage limits. Missing or conflicting evidence remains visible instead of being treated as safe.
Deterministic, reviewable decisions
Cryptographic function, algorithm family, business context and protection lifetime feed explainable assessments. PQC-labelled observations still require deployment verification.
Ownership before orchestration
Dependency-aware plans, version-bound decisions, time-bounded exceptions and independent verification gates organise migration work without performing production changes.
Integrity is not assurance
Sanitised offline bundles can be signed and checked for integrity while signer trust, observation quality and production assurance remain separate claims.
Public assurance statement
Useful now, bounded by design
This page deliberately separates what the project can demonstrate in a controlled environment from the external evidence required for a real deployment.
Demonstrated locally
- Versioned schemas, deterministic rules and traceable evidence links.
- Generated and simulated discovery scenarios with explicit maturity labels.
- Dependency-aware migration planning, approval and exception controls.
- Tenant-scoped workflow semantics and proposal-only integration boundaries.
Still requires external proof
- Written authority and a bounded, read-only pilot scope.
- Authenticated sources, a real asset denominator and privacy review.
- Production identity, recovery, service-level and operating evidence.
- Independent security testing and adapter-specific approval.
Current position: the repository is suitable for architecture review, controlled demonstrations and discussion of migration governance. It is not presented as a production service, vulnerability scanner or proof that an organisation is quantum-safe.
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